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2 Altruity: a philosophical approach  
 to the fight against poverty
2.1 Poverty and freedom
Why help the poor? Out of a sense of duty? From religious 
conviction? For the sake of kindness, empathy, generosity? 
There are numerous motivations. There also numerous coun-
ter-motivations: they are called selishness, individualism, 
negligence, or the shirking of duty. There are those who feel 
that the poor are alien to them, and that they have no responsi-
bility towards them. The poor, it is said, are entirely responsi-
ble for their own poverty. Up to them to get out of poverty, if 
that’s what they want. The poor are free to stay poor or not, just 
as the non-poor are free to help them, or not. This viewpoint, 
fortunately, is not shared by everyone, but it can only be refut-
ed by examining the notions of freedom and responsibility.
What do we mean by “poor”? Many economists rely on 
quantiied deinitions. In developing countries, the poor are 
those who live below a threshold set, by the United Nations 
in 2008, at 1.25 dollars per person per day. For rich countries, 
we use thresholds or percentages: in France, the poor are 
those whose incomes are 50%–or in the case of extreme pov-
erty, 60%–below the national median income. Taking a quite 
different perspective, one can, with Georges Simmel, say that 
the poor are those who are in need of assistance (Simmel, 
1908). Poverty then becomes a function of the relationship 
that is established between the poor person and myself. As I 
have argued elsewhere (TA, chh.6 & 8), these deinitions re-
lect distinct points of view. Distinct, but not mutually exclu-
sive–they can be complementary. The decision to prioritize 
one or the other is not without consequence. If the poor are 
those who earn less than $1.25 a day, I can claim to have no 
obligation towards them, and can even hold them responsible 
D- Altruity: Key to the Fight Against Poverty
Philippe Kourilsky
Professor at the Collège de France
Abstract. This paper presents the concept of altruity and illustrates its philosophical and practical importance 
in the ight against poverty. Altruity–a highly speciic form of rational altruism–is the duty that comes with 
freedom. The individual duty of altruity is the necessary counterpart of the right to individual freedoms. It is, 
by its very nature, distinct from (though complementary to) generosity, and devoid of any expectation of reci-
procity (while not excluding it). The idea of altruity is the cornerstone of a theory of individual responsibility, 
and of a theory of justice, which provide a conceptual framework for the struggle against poverty. And because 
it is only meaningful if implemented with a pre-deined method, it also provides a framework for action, as the 
FACTS Initiative has shown. Altruity thus emerges as one of the keys to the ight against poverty.
Keywords. Field action, altruity, social justice, liberalism, freedom, poverty.
1 Introduction
Poverty is one of the greatest problems of our time. Almost 
one billion men, women and children are seriously aflicted 
by hunger. Almost two billion live in conditions of precari-
ous hygiene, with a shortage of drinking water, sanitation, 
electricity and other essential goods. Over the next 40 years, 
this planet is expected to accommodate a further 2.5 to 3 bil-
lion inhabitants on top of the 7 billion it currently holds. 
Must I continue to recite this litany of all too familiar igures, 
all too often ignored, neglected or forgotten? Poverty rav-
ages the poorest countries on earth, and remains a scourge 
even in the richest nations. It raises problems of every kind: 
philosophical and moral, political and economic. The ight 
against poverty, meanwhile, is faced with very speciic, 
practical obstacles, whether inancial or operational.
In two recent books (Kourilsky, 2008; Kourilsky, 2010)–
which I shall refer to as TA (for Le Temps de l’Altruisme) and 
MA (for Le Manifeste de l’Altruisme)–I analyzed the notion 
of altruism from a new angle. I extracted what I saw as its 
principal component, to which I gave the name “altruity”. 
Although this research was inspired by the issue of poverty, 
the link between altruity and poverty was not examined in 
detail in these works. The aim of this paper is to show that 
altruity provides a dual key–philosophical and practical–for 
those who would ight poverty. But irst, a point of method: in 
what follows, I will shuttle back and forth between two points 
of view that pertain to the same concept: a general viewpoint, 
which often corresponds to a somewhat idealist approach, 
and a contextual viewpoint, more typical of a pragmatic ap-
proach. This way of thinking is common in the analysis of 
complex systems; they have to studied at different levels of 
complexity, which are subsequently correlated and recon-
ciled, rather than placed in opposition (TA, ch.3; MA, ch.5).
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for their condition. If the poor are deined by their need for 
assistance, the question of the link between them and me is 
posed from the outset, and with it, that of the freedom of both 
parties, poor and non-poor. 
An essential contribution made by Amartya Sen was to 
demonstrate that poverty constitutes a loss of freedom(s). 
Amartya Sen deines individual freedoms (or capabilities) as 
the freedoms that people enjoy to lead the kind of life they 
value (Sen, 2000). What does it mean to be free in principle 
if you are dying of hunger for lack of resources? Freedom is, 
of course, a universal principle to which we all subscribe. But 
we should also seek to understand how it is expressed in a 
given context. As I have pointed out elsewhere (MA, ch.5), 
the notion of “individual freedom” is the contextual corollary 
of the universal idea of “freedom”. And again, it makes no 
sense to place them in opposition. Far from being mutually 
exclusive, the two ideas are destined to be complementary, to 
coexist, to both be part of the bigger picture.
2.2 Altruity, or the duty that comes with freedom
It is widely accepted that one person’s freedom ends where 
another’s begins, and that freedom therefore must have limits 
in any society. But when one looks at the question from the 
angle of individual freedoms, it becomes clear that one per-
son’s freedom is also constructed by that of other people. If I 
am too poor to buy bread, I suffer from a deicit of individual 
freedoms. But if I do have the means to buy bread, I still need 
a baker to make it and sell it. In the contextual, pragmatic ap-
proach to individual freedoms, the idea of freedom must also 
be based on the necessary interdependence between people, 
which, as it happens, is increasingly evident in a globalised 
world. Each person’s freedom is both constructed and 
limited by that of other people.
The postulate that underpins the rest of my approach is that 
there are no rights without associated duties. And yet there is 
one right that is universally recognized as fundamental: the 
right to freedom. What, then, is the corresponding duty? Seen 
at the contextual level, that of individual freedoms, the an-
swer becomes clear. It is the duty to contribute to the con-
struction of other people’s individual freedoms. This is what 
I call the individual duty of altruity (MA, ch.1). And at the 
level of the universal idea of freedom, we arrive at the fol-
lowing statement: the right to freedom corresponds to a 
duty of altruity, altruity being deined as a “purposeful 
commitment to act for the freedom of others”.
In this deinition, the commitment to act for the freedom of 
others stems corresponds to a form of altruism (TA, ch.7). As 
for the adjective “purposeful”, it implies something that has 
been thought through. The purposeful commitment to act for 
the freedom of others is therefore a highly speciic variant of 
rational altruism. After the publication of my two books on 
this question, I observed from day-to-day usage that the many 
meanings conveyed by the word “altruism” interfered with 
the very speciic meaning that I wanted to give it. To avoid 
confusion, I coined the term “altruity”, which I now use.
This intellectual shuttling between “individual freedoms” 
and “freedom” is echoed by a similar back-and-forth move-
ment between “individual duty of altruity and “duty of 
altruity”. It is at the contextual level that the crucial idea of 
proportionality between individual freedoms and the indi-
vidual’s duty of altruity comes into play. This makes sense at 
the moral level as well as the practical level: the greater my 
individual freedoms, the greater also is my capacity to act, and 
with it, my duty of altruity. Here, then, are the foundations of 
a theory of individual responsibility (TA, ch.7). It can only 
be implemented if individuals themselves evaluate their own 
freedoms and their duty of altruity (MA, ch.6). I will return to 
this central point in the second part of this paper. 
This conception of individual responsibility has numerous 
implications. In particular, it can be scaled up to apply to a 
social group of any size, so long as that group claims to value 
freedom, because that claim entails a duty of altruity (MA, 
ch.9). At the national scale, for example, one can conceive of 
a duty of national altruity, directed at the most deprived, both 
inside and outside the country. The beneiciaries would be 
other, poorer, nations, as well as the poor that live in the 
country concerned.
2.3 Altruity, generosity and reciprocal giving
At the scale of the individual, the introduction of the idea of 
altruity helps to clarify two important points. Firstly, altruity is 
radically different from generosity. Generosity appeals to the 
heart as much as the head, whereas altruity strives to be exclu-
sively rational. Moreover, generosity belongs to the domain of 
the freedoms: I am perfectly free to be generous or not, and I 
can even decide how my gift is allocated, by choosing, for 
example, to support the arts rather than help the poor. Altruity, 
on the other hand, is a duty that is incumbent upon me on ra-
tional grounds and within a set moral framework. This moral 
framework is secular in so far as it does not invoke any tran-
scendental power, but it is compatible with most religious 
codes of ethics. Altruity and generosity therefore belong to 
separate categories. That doesn’t stop them being comple-
mentary; indeed, when it comes to dealing with poverty, they 
make a good match. Nonetheless, the distinction between the 
two leads us to ask the following question: Is generosity suf-
icient to solve the problem of poverty? The whole of histori-
cal experience provides a clear, simple answer: no. 
Altruity is also distinct from the idea that gained currency 
following the anthropological works of Marcel Mauss (1925), 
according to which all gifts are made with the expectation of 
a counter-gift. Altruity is radically asymmetrical. The duty of 
altruity is in no way reliant on expectations of reciprocity. 
Which is not to say that reciprocity is not a motivation for 
certain human actions; simply that it is not the sole motiva-
tion. Alongside reciprocal giving, there is room for rational 
behaviours guided by the idea of altruity. This is an important 
distinction, because it is this theory of reciprocal gift- 
exchange, often combined with game theory, that underpins 
much of the experimental psychology research–and most of 
the economic theory–on altruism (Kolm, 2006).
2.4 The question of social justice
Altruity also provides the basis for a theory of justice, which 
encompasses social justice (MA, ch.10). Individuals who 
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practice altruity are, on the whole, likely to formulate more 
equitable judgments, and over time–providing the democrat-
ic mechanisms function correctly–this will inevitably pro-
duce more social justice. Following the line recommended by 
Amartya Sen (Sen, 2010), and contrary to that traced out by 
John Rawls (Rawls, 1971), this theory does not seek to shed 
light on the nature of perfect justice, nor to deine perfect in-
stitutions that could deliver such a thing. The theory of justice 
derived from altruity leaves open the question of the ends, 
and of the practical means for attaining them. Consequently, 
it can adapt to several types of political system, so long as 
they allow individual viewpoints to be expressed, reported 
and integrated. These indeterminations, and the “statistical” 
nature of the process of integrating different viewpoints, 
merely relect the freedom of each individual and the respon-
sibility that goes with it. In this context, the social contract 
will still apply, but between individuals who have irst evalu-
ated their own duty of altruity. The notion of contract here 
needs to be seen dynamically: it is not ixed within a pre- 
existing framework. This makes it more realistic, as the 
stakeholders have taken stock of their obligations and their 
capacity for action (TA, ch.10).
This conception of justice is, therefore, method-based. 
It has no normative content. It does not prescribe ideal insti-
tutions. It does not promote perfect equality between men. 
Instead, it proposes a probabilistic system for reducing injus-
tice and inequality, in a pragmatic mode, based on analyzing 
the facts on the ground. Far from implying the abandonment 
of universal ideals, it provides a way of moving towards them 
(MA, ch.9).
Thus, through altruity, a logical link is established between 
the idea of freedom and that of social justice: the right to 
freedom implies a duty of altruity, and the performance of 
that duty contributes to the furtherance of social justice. This 
schema is of critical importance, because it leads us to ques-
tion liberal political philosophies.
2.5 Questioning liberalism
Do the political philosophies that come under the banner of 
liberalism respect this link between freedom and social jus-
tice? All of them uphold the idea of liberty. Yet the generic 
term “liberalism” covers quite distinct theories with very 
 different social and economic consequences, as was clearly 
brought to light by the inancial crisis of 2007-2008 (Stiglitz, 
2010; Supiot, 2010). Put simply, at one extreme, we have 
ultra-liberalism: the least possible government and the few-
est possible taxes, both being seen as encroachments on the 
freedom of citizens. The corollary to that is limited public 
social assistance, which may be supplemented by individual 
generosity. At the other extreme is the welfare state, with 
highly developed social services, funded, as they must be, 
by high taxes (Rosanvallon, 1995). Experience suggests that 
the problems of poverty are less acute in the latter case than 
in the former–judging by the notable differences observed 
between the United States (with a liberal formula being 
pulled towards ultra-liberalism by a fringe of the Republican 
party) and France (with a welfare state being pulled towards 
greater state intervention by part of the left). In general, the 
ultra-liberals promise stronger economic growth, and claim 
that the increase in national wealth will eventually trickle 
down to the poorest–a claim which is not always borne out. 
Welfare states are more concerned with social protection 
and the regulated redistribution of wealth, but the mecha-
nisms involved are accused of weighing down the economy 
and hampering growth–which is indeed sometimes the case. 
That being said, there are still considerable problems of so-
cial justice in most of the developed countries within the 
fold of  liberalism. Moreover, to date, the rich countries have 
not managed–or perhaps wanted–to resolve the problem of 
poverty outside their borders. Far from it. And as stated 
above, a free nation has a duty of altruity not only towards 
its own citizens, but also towards other nations. From this 
viewpoint, my assessment is that it is almost impossible to 
reduce injustice at the global scale under the liberal system 
as it currently stands.
Since its very origins, liberalism has, I feel, suffered from 
a deep-seated law, which is now being exposed and exacer-
bated by particular historical and demographic circumstanc-
es (MA, chh.2 & 3). My contention is that this law, of a 
moral nature, stems from the very idea of freedom, when 
understood as a basic right without being clearly tied to an 
individual duty. In the welfare state system, many duties re-
lating to social justice are in fact identiied, but they are 
transferred to the collectivity without suficient involvement 
of individuals. In an ultra-liberal system, such transfers to 
the collectivity are avoided, even resisted, and matters of so-
cial justice are left to the discretionary generosity of indi-
viduals, which, is we saw, is distinct from altruity. It is, 
therefore, the absence of the concept of altruity that, in every 
case, undermines  liberal moral and political philosophies. 
Unless due consideration is given to altruity, and unless the 
moral law of liberalism is seen for what it is, and counter-
acted, then the issue of poverty, at the national as well as the 
global scale, will not be adequately addressed. Hence the 
idea of an “altruistic liberalism” which I have advocated 
elsewhere (TA, ch.12, MA, ch.11), and which could come 
into being in a “post-liberal” era, if one wants to use that 
term to emphasize the need for a break with the current pe-
riod. As regards France, so proud of the principles that stem 
from the Revolution, I think the word “altruity” should be 
included in the motto of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” 
which is the badge of the Republic. The trilogy “Liberty, 
Equality, Altruity” sounds about right. If we want to keep 
the idea of fraternity, we could settle for the tetralogy: 
“Liberty, Equality, Altruity, Fraternity” (MA ch.8), even if it 
is somewhat less easy on the ear.
3 Altruity: a practical approach  
 to fighting poverty 
3.1 Altruity and the development  
of the individual viewpoint 
Another major characteristic of altruity is that its implemen-
tation calls for a speciic approach. The concept is meaning-
less unless combined with a method: the idea of altruity is 
unusable unless it comes with a set of instructions. The 
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reason for this is simple. In its very principle, whatever the 
intended action (the ight against poverty, policy decisions, 
etc.) its implementation requires that every individual be 
 fully aware of his or her individual freedoms and of the 
 corresponding duty of altruity. Moreover, putting plans into 
practice in a selected ield calls for active and rational relec-
tion, and this requires that the individual has relevant infor-
mation and knowledge, and takes them into account. This 
obligation applies to anyone who claims any kind of objectiv-
ity. People have a duty to inform themselves, and this corre-
sponds, as we shall see, to a right to information.
Keeping informed is essential for anyone who intends to 
examine an issue in depth. If I keep informed, it is to build 
and supplement my knowledge so that I gain a better under-
standing of a dual reality: that of my place in the world (from 
which I derive the awareness of my individual freedoms and 
my duty of altruity) and that of the problem I seek to attack. 
In a rational approach, which is partly based on introspection 
(since I have put myself in the position of analyzing my own 
situation), and partly on observation (since I am preparing to 
address a speciic issue, namely that of poverty), it is my task 
to formulate well-constructed viewpoints, which, if they are 
to be robust, must be not only well-informed, but also, as we 
shall see below, validated.
The method of thought that enables one to make progress 
towards these objectives is, as I have argued elsewhere (TA, 
chh.1, 2, 3), close to the scientiic method. I maintain that 
there is no fundamental difference between the objects of 
 science and the “ordinary” objects that make up our environ-
ment. The difference lies, rather, in the attention they receive. 
The very notion of reality is obviously a topic of discussion, 
but there can be no doubt that science discovers elements of 
reality, some of which elude, or even contradict, our intuition. 
A method of thought of the same order as the scientiic meth-
od, and applied to “ordinary” objects, can therefore do the 
same. Thus, simply expanding the scope of my thinking 
about such ordinary objects as a table or a loaf of bread is li-
able to the change their reality-content. In particular, because 
this expansion involves taking into consideration other ob-
jects that interact with the irst object, there is every chance I 
will bring in the human factor, in the form, here, of the car-
penter and the baker, in addition to the table and the loaf of 
bread. In other words, a method of thought that seeks to ratio-
nally explore ields of reality is likely to favour the discovery 
of the Other, and to surface a number of previously unnoticed 
social aspects (TA, ch.3).
Now we come to the validation stage. If my viewpoint is 
to be robust, it needs to have been subjected, as far as possi-
ble, to reality-testing, and also to criticism from others. Once 
again, scientiic practice is instructive. It shows us the impor-
tance of debate and the constructive confrontation of views. 
There is not a single scientiic inding–even in mathematics–
that is not subject to peer-review. In the “exact” sciences, 
more than in the human sciences, the process often culmi-
nates in a (near) consensus. For this reason, science currently 
represents the inest form of the democracy of knowledge. 
Similarly, my viewpoint on anything, including the assess-
ment of my duty of altruity, cannot be considered to be robust 
unless I have submitted it to others for criticism and 
discussion (MA, Ch.6). The inal choice, however, is mine, 
and my freedom will be respected. 
That being said, my choice will often not be solely rational. 
I will probably bring some of my own history into the mix, 
some of my own hopes and aspirations. My inal stance will 
not necessarily conform to what my duty of altruity–or the 
elements of validation received from other people–would 
dictate. This is why the introduction of altruity into human 
behaviours has what I describe as a “probabilistic” dimen-
sion. As I suggested earlier, it involves a wager. There is a 
good probability that altruity will improve my sense of 
 responsibility, and, through the aggregation of individual 
 behaviours, improve social justice. But it is only a probabili-
ty: the inluence of my impulses, interests and passions is not 
eliminated by altruity, it is only balanced by it. Which is why 
education is of such importance–including education in al-
truity–due to its capacity to promote rational and reasonable 
attitudes, and to contain impulses and passions. 
3.2 Putting knowledge at the service  
of the ight against poverty
The rational process required for the implementation of altru-
ity depends, then, on an active search for information, which 
must culminate in a better understanding–and a well- grounded 
judgment–of the situation. This statement of principle, which 
applies to any individual, leads to a more general question: do 
we, overall, have enough knowledge at our disposal in the 
ight against poverty? The answer is negative. There are seri-
ous deicits of knowledge, evident in research, in education, 
and more widely in the way knowledge is produced. Research, 
for example, on the social and solidarity-based economy, and 
on the economics of philanthropy, is still thin on the ground 
(Kolm et al., 2006). The methodical comparative evaluation 
of ield actions has opened up a new, but still largely unex-
plored, area (Dulo, 2010). In the educational domain, the cre-
ation of professorial chairs and specialist courses on the ight 
against poverty is still a very recent phenomenon, although 
many leading universities and institutions, in France and 
abroad, now have them1.
It is in the production and dissemination of knowledge that 
we ind the worst shortcomings. We have done far from 
enough to capitalize on knowledge and know-how about ield 
actions. We replicate our failures, but not our successes. 
Generally speaking, ieldwork is not suficiently grounded in 
established facts. As a result, a considerable share of the effort 
and resources invested in the ight against poverty is dissipat-
ed in ineffective actions. It was to help redress this deplorable 
state of  affairs that the FACTS (Field ACTion Science) initia-
tive was set up. Its goal is to improve the situation of the poor 
and deprived through better use and more eficient dissemina-
tion of knowledge and know-how (Kourilsky et al., 2009). 
More speciically, it starts out from the observation that the 
results of ield experiments–especially those with innovative 
1 As illustrated by the creation in 2007 of the professorial chair on «Knowl-
edge against Poverty» at the College de France (http://www.college-de-
france.fr/) 
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indings–are all too rarely written up, evaluated, published and 
circulated. This is due to the fact that it is neither a rule nor 
common practice among ieldworkers to publish their results 
and submit them to peer review. In this respect, their communi-
ties are very different from scientiic communities, for whom it 
is a central obligation. The creation of an international journal–
FACTS Reports–aims to help remedy this situation.2 
It is useful at this point to specify the link between the idea 
of altruity and the ight against poverty on the ground. The 
ight is conducted in an environment strongly permeated by 
generosity. As altruity presupposes a rational and methodical 
approach, at every level of relection and action, it obliges the 
ield actors who practice it to become informed, to inform 
others, and to open themselves up to constructive criticism in 
order to obtain validation. These are the very principles that 
presided the creation of FACTS Reports, where the results 
are published after peer review. As noted earlier, if altruity 
implies a duty to inform oneself, there must also be a corre-
sponding right: the right to information (MA, ch.8). This is 
not just a theoretical freedom, or an absence of censorship. It 
requires that information be available and accessible in prac-
tice. In this respect, the creation of FACTS Reports is also a 
step in the direction of the right to information which ield 
actors are supposed to enjoy.
4 Conclusion
The concept of altruity structures the debate in two ways. At 
the philosophical level, it provides the framework for an ar-
gument that underpins a theory of individual responsibility 
as well as a theory of justice. At the practical level, it implies 
the implementation of a method in which rationality, knowl-
edge and debate are the foundations of relection and action. 
The concept of altruity is crucial in many different ields. In 
political philosophy, it leads to the idea of rebuilding liberal-
ism as “altruistic liberalism” (MA, ch.11). In economics, it is 
becoming essential to integrate it into whole segments of 
economic theory (MA, ch.7), as H. Defalvard (2011a & b) 
has sought to do. It leads, notably, to the ethical evaluation of 
the externalities associated with economic decisions and 
phenomena (MA ch.7).
With speciic reference to the ight against poverty, the con-
cept of altruity provides a moral framework that justiies, sup-
ports and extends the ight, as a key question of social justice 
at the local, national and international scale. It also provides a 
practical method for approaching the problems of poverty, 
which usefully stresses rationality, knowledge and validation 
through discussion. Herein lies one of the original features of 
the aforementioned FACTS Initiative, whose link to science 
2 FACTS Reports is a free, open-access, electronic platform, for publish-
ing innovative results obtained from ieldwork, in a replicable form, and 
after peer review by other ield actors. This is only the irst stage, albeit 
a signiicant one, in the FACTS Initiative which seeks, more generally, 
to facilitate communication between ield actors, to help them structure 
their communities, and to develop a culture of evidence-based action. A 
welcome side effect is that it affords the actors in question a degree 
of well-deserved recognition, which has often been singularly lacking 
(cf. Kourilsky et al., 2009, founding text of the FACTS Initiative).
(embodied in the acronym FACTS = Field ACTion Science) 
comes as no surprise, because the methodology it proposes for 
ield action is analogous to the scientiic method.
Donations, markets and regulations are three pillars of the 
ight against poverty. Altruity plays a role in all three. It clar-
iies the question of gift-giving relative to the exercise of 
generosity or the expectation of a counter-gift. And although 
this point has not been covered, altruity is clearly involved in 
the design and adoption of regulations. It questions the eco-
nomic workings of markets, and can help in formalizing and 
promoting the social and solidarity-based economy. Finally, 
it contains a fourth dimension. In its implementation, it con-
stitutes a method that promotes knowledge-based action 
validated by peer review. For all of these reasons, the con-
cept of altruity emerges clearly as one of the keys to the ight 
against poverty.
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